with the European. A law having universal application had drastically unequal consequences.
The Aboriginal population were legislated for specifically in a multiplicity of subject matters. Special laws were devised and applied as for a special people. Accordingly, one of the first tasks of the law-makers and the law-management or law-enforcement agencies was to define, with as much legal precision as legal skills or human ingenuity could devise, who was an Aborigine. The antecedent characteristic of race or 'blood' might break down over generations but the negative reach of the law still could obtain with results far more devas tating than for a person not categorised as Aboriginal under particular legislation. Explicit inclusion in one category all too often was implicit exclusion from another.
Allied to the legal position of the Aborigines, which defined their status and position in society, was the political aspect of power. The excessive measures as by law provided per force were founded on notions of superiority (racial, cultural, political) and thereby legalised.
The inferiority of the Aborigine was translated in terms of powerlessness: the inability effectively to thwart, challenge, oppose or even influence at any level within the political or economic structure.
Legal Definitions.
From my analysis of 700 separate pieces of legislation dealing specifically with Aborigines or Aboriginal matters -or other seemingly non-Aboriginal matters -no less than 67 identi fiable classifications, descriptions, or definitions have been used from the time of European settlement to the present.3 These classifications may be grouped under six broad headings according to anthropometric or racial identification; territorial habitation, affiliation, or attachment; blood or lineal grouping, including descent; subjective identification; exclu sionary and other; and Torres Strait Islanders. Some definitions, such as 'Aborigine', have what I call 'multi-factor' references. These are categories of persons, or classes answering a legislative description, which are or are deemed to be within that framework. Professor Rowley in 1970 asked, and then answered, the question 'Who is an Aboriginal?' in Appendix A of his The Destruction o f Aboriginal Society. Some of my analysis traverses the same ground, but his analysis stopped at 1967 and started at about 1905. Nearly all the nine teenth-century legislation was ignored, but historic parallels formulated under markedly different socio-political conditions persisted well into the twentieth century, a feature not sufficiently brought out by Rowley. For some States, therefore, Aboriginal policy, and its legislative expression, remained static and immured, entrenched by perceptions inapplicable to modern times and conditions.
Prior to the 1967 referendum, the Australian Constitution referred to Aborigines at two places, both in negative terms. In section 51(xxvi) the Commonwealth was given legislative power other than for 'the aboriginal race in any State'; and in section 127 'aboriginal natives' were not to be counted in reckoning the numbers of the people of the Commonwealth, or of a State. At a number of places in the Constitution 'people' is used in a quantitative sense: to determine representation (s.24), allocation of expenditure debits (s.89(iiXb)). At other places 'person' is used for acquisition of property (s.51(xxxi), or appointment of deputies to the Governor-General (s.126). So that the fundamental machinery of governance com prehended both terms. Yet 'aboriginal natives' rather than 'the people of any race' or 'the people of the aboriginal race' was used in section 127. It is almost as if the framers of thê Constitution unconsciously rejected human attributes in contemplating 'aboriginal natives'.
The States both during the Constitutional Conventions (1891, 1897, and 1898) and at Federation were left in effective control of their Aboriginal populations, unfettered by a clear and present Commonwealth power. Secondly, it was not known how many 'aboriginal natives' existed, the enumeration in the several States and New Zealand proceeding in incom plete and inconsistent fashion. In Western Australia, for example, only 'civilized Aborigines' were included; there, and in Victoria, 'half castes' also were enumerated. In Tasmania, the last 'full-blood' male having died in 1869 and the last 'full-blood' female in 1876, only 'halfcastes' were counted. All States counted their 'native' population as at 1891, except Queens land, whose base date was 1881. Thirdly, the Aborigines generally were considered a dying race, whose inclusion in the people of the Constitution was not only unnecessary but likely to create future problems of proportional representation. Finally, the Convention debates are replete with thinly-disguised expressions of contempt for non-Caucasoids, and parti cularly Australoids.
The birth of a supposedly free, liberal and democratic nation -all of whose inhabitants were 'subjects of the Queen' under the Constitution (s. 117) -was therefore attended by illiberal sentiment, legislative prescriptions, and denial of basic democratic rights and free doms solely on the ground of racial antecedents or association.
The dominant expression in other Commonwealth legislation was 'aboriginal native of Australia'. That reference First appeared in 1902 in the Commonwealth Franchise A ct and was last used in 1973 in the Aboriginal Affairs (Arrangements with the States) Act. Curious ly, it was not defined until the National Service A ct 1951 and then the legislation left it to be defined by Regulation. Accordingly, almost from the outset, Commonwealth legislation quite deliberately refrained from providing an unambiguous, and consistent meaning to the expression. The policy motive was laissez-faire in relegating to administrative action the for mulation of an acceptable reference. Doubtless, the absence of any direct Commonwealth constitutional responsibility for Aborigines induced such a motive. The States until 1911, and the States and Territories thereafter, had responsibility for their Aboriginal and 'halfcaste' population, which relegated Commonwealth interest and responsibility to one of patronage.
A distinction based on blood first appeared in the Sugar Bounty A ct 1905, providing a bounty for sugar cane or beet produced by 'white' and not 'coloured' labour. 'Coloured' labour was defined to include 'half-caste' and 'full-blood', but the Act excluded 'full-blood' and -with special permits -'half-caste' Aboriginal labour from its purview. Accordingly, legislation could create artificial barriers based on blood or descent to confer or deny to third parties a benefit or privilege. The Commonwealth was prepared to accept such barriers created by individual States, even if it meant uneven results between States. The Common wealth Electoral Act 1918 provided for a Commonwealth franchise if the individual Abo rigine was qualified to vote by State legislation; the Invalid and Old-age Pensions A ct 1942 provided for those pensions to be paid to 'exempt' Aborigines.
In 1964 a reference to the Aboriginal 'people of Australia' first appears in legislation establishing the Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies, and was used in 1968, 1969 and 1975 . Even so, the former reference continued in use for a further nine years. The concept of 'race' was first expressed in the Aboriginal Enterprises (Assistance) A ct 1968, and was used again in 1975-76, 1978-79, 1980 and 1982. At given stages, an 'Aboriginal' could be a member of a 'people', a 'race', or one of the 'natives' or 'native inhabitants' of Australia. Further, Commonwealth regulations made under the National Service A ct 1951 fully described Aboriginally in terms of admixture of 'blood'. Under Commonwealth law an Aborigine might acquire a legal status for some pur poses but not others according to the reach of legislation. The States, and later the Territories, defined Aborigines mainly by 'blood'. The word Aborigine in its primary etymological sense described the inhabitants of a country Ab-origine that is, from the beginning, and so means the earliest known inhabitants. A secondary mean ing refers to the natives found in possession of a country by European colonists. Australia, however, has given a third popular meaning to describe the natives indigenous to it. Much of the colonial legislation described those natives by reference to habitation ('aboriginal natives of New South Wales and New Holland') but increasingly it described them in terms of ad mixture or preponderance of 'blood'. The proliferation of children having 'white' blood in their veins, and the decline of the 'full-blood' population, prompted a legislative response to redeem the former and protect the latter. The Victorian Aborigines Protection A ct 1869 is instructive. Section 8 of the Act deemed as Aboriginal 'every aboriginal native of Australia', every 'aboriginal half-caste' and any child of such 'half-caste' associating and living with Aborigines. A form of 'guilt by association' brought the subject within the reach of the Act. In the absence of any proof as to status, any justice of the peace could form a subjective view as to whether or not any person were an Aborigine. The first Act in Australia set the pattern for all other States. First, the notion of 'blood', however descended; second, the mode of living; third, the extended reach of legisla tion by use of 'deeming' provisions; and finally, the grant of broad discretionary power to a person in authority without proper legislative safeguards. All these created a legal status accorded no others in the several States.
Subsequent legislation refined the definition in a way which extended bureaucratic dis cretion over a wider range of subjects and minimised external or individual 'interference'. For example, the South Australian legislation of 1911 included a 'half-caste' child under 16, the Northern Territory Ordinance of the same year included not only a 'half-caste' child under 18, but a female 'half-caste' not legally married to 'a person who is substantially of European origin or descent and living with her husband'. There were no definitions of 'Euro pean' nor of 'substantially', it being left to regulation to implement. The 1924 Aboriginals Ordinance (N.T.) extended the definition to include 'half-caste' males below the age of 21; it was extended again in 1927 to any male 'whose age exceeds twenty-one years and who, in the opinion of the Chief Protector, is incapable of managing his own affairs and is declared by the Chief Protector to be subject to this Ordinance'. The emphasis is constantly on extending the class of persons subject to the Ordinance, and on expanding the discretionary power of the Chief Protector or other senior official. The 1936 amendments to the Ordi nance provided for a declaration of exemption of 'half-castes' and for a revocation of such declaration.
Thus, an artificial status could be created, removed, and reimposed at the behest of officialdom: this was extended in 1943 to 'full-bloods' in the Northern Territory.4 5 The definition of 'half-caste' was omitted in 1953, but the status of 'part Aboriginal' created.6 7 These legislative sleights-of-hand were removed in the Northern Territory in 1957 with the commencement of the Welfare Ordinance 1953. That Ordinance created the legal class of 'ward', being a person declared by the Administrator to stand in need of the special care and assistance afforded by the Ordinance. The Ordinance automatically created as a class of persons not liable to be declared those who were, or would be enrolled or entitled to be en rolled as voters, or were spouses of those persons. In other words, the only classes of persons who could be declared were Aborigines. What criteria attended and presupposed a declara tion? Section 14 (1) referred to that person's manner of living, his inability adequately to manage his own affairs, his standard of social habit and behaviour, and his personal asso ciations. Appeal against declaration was possible, but the onus of proof lay on the 'ward' to demonstrate that he satisfied the criteria. In fact, the then Administrator made an en bloc declaration two days after the Ordinance commenced by which, in the Northern Territory, 15,211 persons were declared wards. Even though the Ordinance spoke of 'his' manner of living in terms of individuality, the High Court upheld the declaration by the Administrator n in Namatjira v. Raabe.
New South Wales legislation in 1901 defined Aborigines as 'an aboriginal native of New South Wales', but in the 1905 legislation used the definition 'aboriginal native of Australia'; that definition included not only 'full-bloods' and 'half-castes' but 'any person apparently having an admixture of aboriginal blood' and either in receipt of assistance from the Abo rigines Board or resident on an Aboriginal reserve. The former definition was given in the Vagrancy Act, and the latter in and for the purposes of the Liquor Amendment Act. Accord ingly, the definition of a person's status could vary for reasons and purposes other than blood: it extended to a specific legislative purpose, contained within the body of an Act otherwise having general application. Even New South Wales introduced 'exemption' provisions, in the Aborigines Protection (Amendment) Act 1943. This recitation of extant statutory provi sions may seem ponderous, but its importance lies in the intent of the legislators conscious ly to creat and sustain designated 'blood' categories for legal purposes, and to insert specifi city of de-categorisation within the whole corpus of legislation.
Early Act, 1936 . The Act created another status, that of 'quad roon' being 'one-fourth of the original full-blood'. But 'quadroons' were not subject to the legislation if they were under 21 and did not associate with or 'live substantially after the manner of Natives'; but even then such a person, and one over 21, could be classified as a 'Native' by order of a magistrate. In 1954 the Native Administration A ct Amendment A ct provided that a 'Native' could be deemed to be no longer a native for the purposes of the Act if he had served as a member of the armed forces outside the Commonwealth or for at least six months within it and was entitled to an honourable discharge. The classification of 'quad roon' was repealed in I960.18 Accordingly, the definition of 'Native' was confined to 'fullbloods' and greater than 'one-fourth of the original full blood' until the blood test was replaced by the 'descent-identification' test in 1972.19 Even the latter test -of identifica tion and acceptance as Aboriginal by the local community -was omitted from another Act in the same year.20 Accordingly, descent is the current test in Western Australia. The legislation of the Commonwealth and the States and Territories therefore proceeded in haphazard, inconsistent, unwieldly and far from uniform fashion to construct an edifice and thereafter maintain and extend it by means of an artifice. The concept of 'blood' re quired ever closer formulation either to include, exclude, or distinguish between the classi fications provided. Where the legislation conferred benefits or imposed restraints and dis abilities the machinery of implementation was either left to administrative or judicial dis cretion or, as in the case of Queensland, assumed grotesque proportions. Artificial legal status could be imposed, withdrawn, re-imposed at the behest of one person in authority. I am not suggesting that they were creatures of whim or caprice. But did they fully consider the policy, spirit and intent of the legislation? The en bloc 1957 declaration of over 15,000 'full-blood' Aborigines as wards in the Northern Territory suggests otherwise.
The policy aims of the legislation likewise seemed self-defeating or inconsistent Within and between States definitions of 'Aborigine' operated differently, at different levels of subject matter, and advancing either in beneficence or in control. A new species of legal creature was created and sustained as a separate class, subject to separate laws, separate ly administered. This form of legal apartheid preceded that of South Africa by more than two generations, and continued on a different, but parallel, course for another three. The effluxion of time might have seen the success of government policy demonstrated with re moval or dismantling of the more repressive definitions and provisions. But Victoria, for example, maintained the same legislative content for 60 years. Western Australia increased its controls by extending definitions in 1936, and Queensland did likewise as recently as 1965. For Aborigines, therefore, the vacuity or bankruptcy of policy in some States was matched only by the ingenuity of others in extending the reach of legislative control. Those who escaped through having a lesser amount of 'black' blood suddenly found themselves made subject to law; those who obtained exemption could lose it. 'Half-castes' might be placed on the same footing with 'full-bloods' for some purposes (testimony, liquor), but not others (reserves, guardianship of children). The unequal provision and treatment of law even within extended Aboriginal associations mocked the notion of equality; when considered in the absence of any comparable law for 'whites', or even other 'colours', it evokes the Aristotelian dictum that 'injustice arises when equals are treated unequally and also when unequals are treated equally'. But how greater is the injustice when even unequals are treated unequally! Judicial Definitions of Race.
Surprisingly, there are few judicial pronouncements on 'race' or 'Aborigine' or 'half-caste' or even the more extreme examples of race legislation such as 'quadroon' or 'assisted Abo rigine'. Surprisingly, because the effect on the individual of falling within the scope of the legislation could be calamitous. Yet there were few challenges to Acts or sections of Acts. To my knowledge, moreover, no Aboriginal administrator in Australia ever prosecuted a tortious action as legal guardian for and on behalf of his wards. Should it be inferred from this wall of silence which enveloped Aborigines that there were no injuries, no injustices or malpractices damaging them and compensable at law? The Commonwealth Court of Con ciliation and Arbitration in 1924 put the lie to this aspect. In a wage claim sought to be ex tended to Aboriginal workers, Powers J referred to the Aboriginals Ordinance prescribing wages as being 'honoured in the breach -not in the observance of it -possibly because it is impossible to enforce it or because of the state of the industry'.29 Certainly the lethargy of the administration in this regard could be described as monumental at best, or criminally conspiratorial at worst.
Most challenges came from non-Aborigines, particularly from Europeans charged with supply of liquor to Aborigines. In Branch v. Sceats, for example, the New South Wales Supreme Court in 1903 held that a son of a 'full-blood' father and a 'half-caste' mother was not 'an aboriginal native of Australia' within the meaning of the Liquor Act, 1898 (N.S.W.).30 These words were applicable only to offspring of parents both of whom were themselves 'aboriginal natives', that is 'full-bloods'. Only two direct challenges to their legal status were mounted by individual Aborigines in 180 years of subjection to white law; both were from the Northern Territory and they were decided in 1961 and 1962 respectively, the latter successfully.
In The Court there considered a claim for exemption from National Service by an Aborigine, and held that a person who has an admixture of Aboriginal 'blood' does not come within the definition of that description. To claim exemp tion he had to establish on the balance of probabilities that he had lived as 'an Aboriginal native' or among Aborigines; the latter required either actual residence with them or the proof of a nomadic life-style. A person could not be held to be living as 'an aboriginal native' when it was shown by evidence that he was living in a house situated amongst those occupied by 'white' citizens of Australia, was generally in regular employment and had been so during the previous five years, owned his own car, travelled to Perth three times a year to visit friends and relatives, conducted himself in a manner acceptable to responsible citizens of his area, dressed well, and was able satisfactorily to speak the English language. His marriage to a de facto wife of even lesser 'Aboriginal blood' and their residing with their children in an ordinary non-Aboriginal community was a stronger factor negating his falling within the purview of the legislative exemption. This case demonstrates the worst aspects of legislativebased racism, assertions of apartheid, negative stereotypes, and the equation of 'white' with 'civilised'. declared invalid, Brennan and Deane JJ in particular considered the proper meaning of 'race'. Firstly, it was 'not a term of art' nor 'a precise concept'; secondly, 'Membership of race imports a biological history or origin which is common to other members of the race'; thirdly, 'physical similarities, and common history, a common religion or spiritual beliefs and a common culture are factors that tend to creat a sense of identity among members of a race and to which others have regard in identifying people as members of a race'. The Court accepted that the words 'the people of any race' used in the Constitution have a wide and non-technical meaning, and that 'Australian Aboriginal' likewise possessed a conventional 90 meaning.
'Race' was considered obiter in 1983 by the Supreme Court of Norfolk Island. Fox CJ held 'that one is entitled to look to the reality to see whether, in substance and effect, that is the criterion used'. Accordingly, he considered the origins of the Pitcairn Islanders, the circumstances of their relocation on Norfolk Island, the existence of 'their own traditions and their own background' and 'a dialect of their own'. The Court, in other words, embraced the same tests and criteria employed by the High Court, although it did not refer to the latter's decision in Tasmanian Dam given eight weeks earlier.
The word 'Aboriginal' was also considered by the High Court in the Utopia Station Land Rights case, decided in 1980.40 The decision in that case turned more on the meaning of a concept of trust and less on the identity and characteristics of 'Aborigines' as defined in the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) A ct 1976. Argument there concentrated on the locality and not the Aboriginal antecedents of the group, who were assumed to possess them.
What these cases signify is a judicial willingness to accept the popular meaning of an ex pression, other than one defined by statute, and to accord it a non-technical sense and applic ation. They also signify the paucity of challenges to the 'Aboriginal' legislation as such, and a total failure of authority to assist or prosecute any such challenge.
In so doing, institutional power was preserved virtually unchallenged; with it the integrity of government policy and programmes was not subjected to the authority and countervailing scrutiny of an impartial tribunal. The law, in other words, signally failed to ameliorate the pervasive generality of Aboriginal institutionalisation and tended to be focused on its peri pheral aspects.
Administrative Definitions.
It is not always appreciated by non-lawyers that the burden of administering the plethora of legislation giving effect to Government policy is accompanied by provisions less than clear and precise not only in their meaning but in their intended application. In the absence of unequivocal statutory instructions or guidelines, bureaucratic or administrative arrangements must be made for the effectual application of legislation. Thus, between policy formulation as enunciated to and agreed by Government and administrative action giving policy force and effect, legal lacunae or gaps commonly occur. In practice, these gaps are filled or covered by judicial or administrative innovation, the one consistent with the language employed by the statute and the concepts discerned within it, the other by knowledge of the policy and its scope possessed by those who assisted in its formulation within the bureaucracy and ultimately charged with administering it.
In 1901 the Commonwealth Attorney-General, Alfred Deakin, gave an opinion that in reckoning the population for the purposes of section 127 of the Constitution 'half-castes' were not 'aboriginal natives' within the meaning of that section and should therefore be included.41 No reason was advanced, except that based on the rule as to the construction of statutory exceptions, namely that where they are not remedial they should be construed strictly. Accordingly, for the purposes of Commonwealth law but not necessarily for any other (State or Territory) law, people with a preponderance of Aboriginal 'blood' were con sidered to be 'aboriginal natives' and those with less were not. This is illustrated in another opinion which, as Attorney-General, Deakin gave in 1902.42 The Excise Tariff A ct 1902 allowed a rebate of excise duties on sugar 'on all sugar cane delivered for manufacture, and in the production of which sugar cane white labour only has been employed'. The Minister for Trade and Customs asked for an opinion, inter alia, on the effect which the employment of persons of mixed blood might have. Deakin again adopted a 'preponderance of blood' test, although Commonwealth law in this area was silent on the point:
quadroons may reasonably be considered as white labour; persons in whom the blood of a coloured race predominates should not. Half-castes are on the border line, but in view of the affirmative and restrictive language of the provision, I think that half-castes should be excluded. advice endured for 60 years in Commonwealth legislation.
In a 1961 opinion furnished to the Select Committee on Voting Rights of Aboriginals, a former Solicitor-General, Sir Kenneth Bailey, advised that in s.51(xxvi) of the Constitution as it then stood the expression 'people o f . . . the aboriginal race' applied only to persons of Aboriginal descent and to persons in whom 'aboriginal blood preponderates ' .46 On that view a person 'of the half-blood', or a person in whom European or other non-Aboriginal 'blood' preponderated, could not be classified as belonging to 'the Aboriginal race'. Indeed, a person of the 'half-blood' would not belong to any race at all.
Even in 1978, administrative discretion was still very wide in the administration of Commonwealth legislation for Aborigines. The Minister representing the Minister for Abo riginal Affairs answered a question on notice as to those considered 'Aboriginal' under Com monwealth law. 47 For purposes of legal aid, as then provided by the Aboriginal Legal Service in New South Wales, the definition of 'Aboriginal' was settled in consultation with the Australian Govern ment, which funded the Service. An 'Aboriginal' was a member or descendant of the Abo riginal race, including Torres Strait Islanders, and 'where it is in the interests of justice in the circumstances of a particular case' a person living in a domestic relationship with an Abo riginal. Any degree of Aboriginality sufficed. 48 For purposes of Commonwealth law, 'Aboriginality' was not exclusively a status con ferred or withdrawn by legislation; it might also be the result of administrative decision, based on application, investigation, consideration or other form of review, decision and certification then required in respect of housing loans, enterprise loans, and grants from the Aboriginal Benefit Trust Account. 49 The criteria employed by third parties or organisations enjoying recognition as bodies authorised to issue certificates which would be recognised for approved government pur poses were neither stated nor known. Further, even in the absence of such certification, the particular government department or instrumentality (be it State or Commonwealth) might pursue those of differing Aboriginal organisations, or proceed according to their 'own methods of determining . . . eligibility'.50
Such ill-defined -or, in the absence of any definition, unknown -criteria promote the prospects of individual abuse, refusal, or neglect of any application dependent upon a demonstration, to administrative satisfaction, of a sufficient degree of Aboriginality.
Non-Aborigines and the Law.
Prior to the assumption of Commonwealth legislative control of naturalisation and aliens,51 and immigration and emigration,52 each State had passed stringent laws severely Asians being associated in the popular mind as ruthless seducers of gullible blacks and breeders and proliferators of 'halfcastes' and other proportionate miscegenations. Non-Europeans had to obtain certificates in order to work in Queensland dairies,62 and as late as 1952 'workers of any Asiatic or Pacific Islands race' were segregated from Europeans in sleeping quarters, separate buildings being provided for each. 63 In the Northern Territory Aboriginal females could not be employed by 'any person of any Asiatic or Negro race'.64 Queensland legislation between 193165 and 196766 deemed a of humanity having the singular misfortune to be born other-than-white. Australian legisla tion was predicated on a basis of white superiority, and white fear. Both 'blood' and econo mic factors predicated a statutory relegation of non-Caucasoids. The legislation was variable, inconsistent or arbitrary in its formulation and implementation. But it was consistent in its identification and choice of subject. The modern expectation of and demand for human rights had no place in a fledgling democracy proudly asserting egalitarian ideals. The edifice of restriction and prohibition was an expression of popular will denying those ideals in an Australia which placed a higher faith in being white than in being democratic. 
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